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Abstract—This paper presents the use of Bayesian networks
for learning decisions made by a human radar operator carrying
out a maritime surveillance mission. By imitating the operator’s
decisions, a significant increase in the autonomy of a radar
surveillance system can be achieved as well as potentially stream-
lining the qualification process. For maritime scenarios, current
literature has only focused on using a Bayesian network (BN) for
identification and assessment, and often assumes inputs from a
generic surveillance sensor. Furthermore, in both the maritime
surveillance and radar operations domain, there has been no
investigation into using the operator’s data in order to learn the
decisions made throughout the mission. This paper uses a real-
time radar simulation in order to obtain the scenario and radar
information that would be observed by a human operator. In
conjunction with a user interface, the simulation is further used to
obtain operator decisions for a given mission with the maximum
likelihood approach used to obtain the BN probabilities. The BN
is then used in place of the operator for interfacing with the
simulation in order to test the suitability of this method. Several
typical scenarios are used to demonstrate the BN’s operational
ability relative to that of the operator. Additionally, the required
data size for sufficient performance is investigated.
Index Terms—Airborne radar, surveillance, Bayesian net-
works, imitation learning, machine learning
I. INTRODUCTION
Current maritime radar surveillance missions are typically
carried out using an airborne platform with one or more
operators on board. With progress being made towards the use
of remotely operated UAVs for radar surveillance missions,
imitating the decisions made by a radar operator with the use
of artificial intelligence (AI) would provide a significant step
forward in autonomy. By reducing the required human input,
and by virtue of the AI being able to perform at all times, the
surveillance can be carried out for longer. Additionally, the AI
can be applied to multiple platforms simultaneously allowing
for greater search area coverage. If it can be shown that the
AI can sufficiently imitate the decisions made by a human
operator, the qualification of the AI for practical operation
could be more streamlined relative to other forms of AI that
either learn unsupervised or are manually crafted.
Bayesian networks, a form of AI, have been used for a
wide variety of tasks in both radar operations and in maritime
surveillance. For example, investigation has been done on the
use of a Bayesian network (BN) for autonomous decision
This work was supported by Leonardo.
making of radar control for polar ice sheet measurements [1].
In terms of maritime surveillance scenarios, a BN has been
used for the identification and assessment of maritime objects
[2], [3]. Furthermore, a maritime simulation of vessels was
used to generate scenarios in which a BN was applied to
identify suspicious ships [4].
A BN has also been used to assist a surveillance system
operator for maritime situational assessment [5], [6]. Expert
knowledge has been used to inform the contextual and be-
havioral information within a scenario in which a dynamic
Bayesian network was used for behavioral based classification
of maritime vessels [7]. Additionally, a BN was used for the
detection of unusual maritime activity where experts were used
to set the network’s conditional probability tables [8].
However, while some of the above works leverage expert
knowledge, they don’t learn from operator data on the sce-
nario nor do they attempt to imitate the operator’s decisions.
Furthermore, they don’t deal with real-time scenarios in which
the operator has a sequence of decisions to make where each
decision results in more situational information. The use of a
BN for this type of imitation task has seen little use [9].
This paper investigates the application of a BN in order
to imitate radar operator decisions for maritime surveillance
missions. Both the missions and the radar were incorporated
within a multi-entity real-time simulation. This simulation
included the dynamics of both the airborne platform and the
maritime vessels, the signal-to-noise (SNR) obtained from
both the environment and the vessels, the tracking of detected
objects, and each vessel’s automatic identification system
(AIS). A graphical user interface (GUI) was also implemented
in order to display the radar information as would be observed
by the human operator in a realistic scenario. The simulation
in conjunction with the GUI was then used to run typical
maritime missions, obtain the information observed by the
operator (e.g. SNR, track data, or AIS data), and obtain
the decisions made by the operator (e.g. move to track, or
communicate with the vessel). The operator’s data is then
used to learn the BN’s conditional probability tables using the
maximum likelihood approach to expectation maximization.
Several typical tasks of varying complexity are outlined
within this paper with each mission involving a sequence
of decisions to be made based on the observed information.
For each task, the BN was used in place of the operator for
interfacing with the simulation in order to test the accuracy
and error margins of the BN decisions relative to that of the
operator. Conclusions are drawn from the size of the data set
required by the network for sufficient performance.
II. BAYESIAN NETWORKS
A Bayesian network [10], [11] represents a series of
connected nodes in the form of a directed acyclic graph
(DAG) with each node representing a variable (which, in this
case, are discrete). Additionally, each connection represents a
conditional dependency between two nodes. The nodes within
the BN are represented by the vector x of length m with each
node xi having parents denoted by vector ui.
The data set obtained from the scenario and the operator’s
decisions is denoted by the N ×m table D, where N is the
number of data instances, and a given data instance is denoted
by the vector di of length m.
The network estimates θ represent the estimated conditional
probabilities for each node. Furthermore, the parameter esti-
mate θx|u is used to define the probabilities of node x given the
values of the node’s parents u. In the case where the operator’s
data is complete (i.e. there are no missing values for each
vector di within the data set D), each parameter estimate can
be updated as follows:
θx|u , PD(x | u) =
C(x | u)
C(u)
, (1)
where PD(x | u) is the probability of event x | u from data
set D. The term C(u), for example, is the number of data
instances di that satisfy event u.
The likelihood of the network estimates θ is defined as the
probability of observing the data set D under the estimates.
However, it is often more convenient to use the log-likelihood
which is defined in (2). By definition, (1) obtains the values
of θ that maximizes the likelihood and thus log-likelihood.
LL(θ|D) , logL(θ|D) =
N∑
i=1
logPθ(di) , (2)
where Pθ(.) is the probability distribution induced by the
network structure and the network estimates θ.
It is often the case that the data set is not complete. In
other words, at least one of the data instances di has a missing
value. For example, if the radar operator does communicate
with the vessel, then vessel reply is not known for that track.
For the scenarios considered in this paper, the data is missing
at random (MAR). That is, the fact that the data is missing
is unrelated to the missing data itself, but it is related to
the observed data of other variables. Under this scenario, the
maximum likelihood approach can be directly expanded to
account for the missing data by using a local search method.
In this case, the expectation maximization (EM) algorithm was
used [11]. This method starts with an initial set of values for
the estimates (denoted by θ0). Using these initial estimates,
the data set is completed by obtaining the probabilities of each
possible completion for instances with missing data. Mainly,
θk is used to complete the data set with the resulting completed
data set used to obtain the new set of parameters θk+1. This
algorithm guarantees that the new set of parameters has a log-
likelihood no less than that of the previous set of parameters.
As such, this process can be iterated until some convergence
criteria is met.
For brevity, the derivation of the algorithm is not mentioned
here. However, it should be noted that for the case of incom-
plete data, the estimates for the next iteration can be obtained
as follows:
θk+1x|u =
∑N
i=1 Pθk(xu | di)∑N
i=1 Pθk(u | di)
. (3)
In practice, the data is looped over with a ‘for’ loop, and
within, a counter cxu at each step is incremented by the
probability Pθk(xu | di) at step i of the loop. It should also
be noted that another counter cu can be obtained by summing
cxu for all values x. This maximum likelihood expectation
maximization algorithm in outlined below.
Algorithm 1: ML Expectation Maximization
Input:
G: Bayesian network structure (X and U)
θ0: inital parameters
D: Data set of size N
η: Tolerance for change in log-likelihood value
Output:
θmll:
begin
k ← 0
λ←∞
while λ < η do
cxu ← 0
for i = 1; i < N ; i← i+ 1 do
foreach xu do
cxu ← cxu + Pθk(xu | di)
end
end
cu =
∑nx
i=1 cxiu
θk+1x|u = cxu/cu
λ = LL(θk+1 |D)− LL(θk |D)
k ← k + 1
end
θmll = θk
end
Since the algorithm is a local search, it may converge on
different parameter estimates based on the initial parameter
estimates θ0. As such, the algorithm was ran 5 times with
the values for θ0 normalized on the first run and randomized
on subsequent runs. The run which provided the highest log-
likelihood was then chosen as the final network. Additionally,
each run was terminated when the log-likelihood for the
network was less than a set tolerance which in this case was
heuristically set to 1× 10−6.
III. RADAR SIMULATION AND OPERATOR INTERFACE
In order to test the algorithm for a variety of maritime
radar surveillance missions, a radar simulation was developed.
This simulation was developed and integrated as part of
the MAVERIC simulation engine [12] which allows for the
simulation of multiple entities (e.g. UAVs, boats) within a
set 3D operational environment. MAVERIC, and consequently
this simulation, was developed in C++ with the use of Qt for
graphical components.
The real-time radar simulation includes power returns from
targets with the use of the radar range equation, an approxi-
mated beam pattern, and the curvature of the earth accounted
for. Sea clutter is also modeled by considering the grazing
angle to the surface and using a constant gamma model.
Targets are then detected using both local area average (LAA)
and M out of N detection, after which a Kalman filter is used
to track the detected targets. Furthermore, the entities under
surveillance (i.e. the vessels) have the ability to contain an
AIS. The user can then fuse the radar tracks with the AIS
data to obtain further information—or lack of information—
on the tracks.
In conjunction to the radar simulation, a graphical user
interface (GUI) was simultaneously developed. This allows
for an operator to carry out a maritime radar surveillance
mission in a similar way to an operator using an actual radar
system within a real environment. The GUI contains a plan
position indicator (PPI) to display the radar returns after LAA
detection has occurred. The current tracks are overlayed on
the PPI display (shown in Fig. 2) with the operator able to
select a track resulting in its information being displayed. The
GUI also contains radar controls (shown in Fig. 1) to allow
for the operator move the platform, and set the sector scan.
Furthermore, there is a control for the operator to communicate
with a tracked vessel and also a control to indicate for the
platform to move towards the track. Additionally, any operator
designated zones (e.g. fishing zones) are overlayed on the
display.
IV. PRELIMINARY RESULTS
Three tasks representing various stages of a maritime
surveillance mission were used to test this method. Each
maritime radar surveillance task was simulated and ran a task-
specific number times in order to capture both the information
observed by the operator and the operator’s decisions. The
scenario used for all tasks involved two designated fishing
zones which are under surveillance by the radar. The operator
is monitoring the search area for suspicious activity that may
occur in the fishing zones such as illegal fishing operations.
Several vessels of random position, speed, heading, RCS, and
type are placed within the scene. Note that the first author of
this paper acted as the operator by following the operational
advice provided by advisors at Leonardo.
The first task involves selecting a track by the process of
elimination. Given whether or not there are tracks within any
of the zones, within a 10 km border of the zones, and/or not
within 10 km of the zones, the operator will decide which
Fig. 1: Section of the radar GUI within MAVERIC.
region to look at first. This decision eliminates all tracks not
within the selected region, and as such only the information
from the remaining tracks is used for the next decision. The
next decision is based on whether or not any of the remaining
tracks have AIS information. If there are unknown tracks, the
third decision is skipped. If there are no unknown tracks, an
additional decision is made on the available tracks based on
whether any of the tracks display abnormalities. In this case,
the abnormalities are whether the track speed and/or size does
not match the information obtained from the AIS. Whether
there were known or unknown tracks, a final decision is made
based on whether any of the remaining tracks are heading
towards the center of the nearest designated zone.
This task is represented by the BN shown in Fig. 3. Note that
the white nodes indicate information obtained by the operator
while the gray nodes indicate decisions from the operator.
The dotted lines indicate that the nodes are not connected
within the Bayesian network, but the decision influences the
information available to that node. The first decision node
TS1 represents the decision to select the tracks within a given
region based on the observed information nodes WZ (within
zone), W10 (within 10 km), NW (not within 10 km). The next
decision node TS2 represents the decision to select tracks
based on the observed information nodes K (known) and
UK (unknown). The additional decision TS3 represents the
decision to further select known tracks based on anomalous
information. The observed information nodes for anomalous
AIS information ASAS (abnormal size, abnormal speed),
ASNS (abnormal size, normal speed), NSAS (normal size,
abnormal speed), and NSNS (normal size, normal speed) are
determined depending on whether or not the observed size and
speed are within the normal operational bounds provided by
the AIS.
Using the track selected by the first decision process, the
operator will further investigate the track. The operator then
Fig. 2: Radar PPI display within the GUI. The pink dots
indicate tracks while the blue dot indicates the currently
selected track. The yellow solid line indicates the current
azimuth of the radar boresight while the green lines indicate
the current sector scan limits. The red box outlines an operator
designated zone.
uses the track’s AIS data in conjunction with the zone region
the track lies within and decides whether or not to apply a
sector scan on that particular track. Additionally, the operator
also decides whether or not to communicate with the vessel
(in the case where the vessel may have their AIS switched
off, for example). The vessel’s reply to the operator provides
further information about the track’s AIS data (e.g. the lack of
a vessel reply may indicate suspicious activity). Lastly, based
on the vessel’s reply, the track direction, and track speed, the
operator will make a decision about whether or not to move
towards the track in order to get a closer look.
This task is represented by the BN shown in Fig. 5. The
observed information nodes IZ, AIS, VR, TD, TS represent the
track being in one of the fishing zones, the track AIS data, the
tracked vessel’s reply, the track direction, and the track speed
respectively. The state of both AIS and VR indicate whether
or not the vessel type is shown as being a fishing boat, not a
fishing boat, or that there is no AIS data. The track direction
indicates whether or not the track is heading towards the center
of the fishing zone. For the BN, the track speed is discretized
into three possible states: 0m s−1 to 10m s−1, 10m s−1 to
20m s−1, and above 20m s−1. The operator decision nodes
SS, CMV, MTT represent the decision to apply a sector scan
to the track, communicate with the track, and move towards
the track respectively.
The final decision process occurs when the operator decides
to move towards the track in order to get a closer look. The
operator has the option of moving towards the track, to the
left of the track, or to the right of the track. For the BN, this
decision is based on the previous two movement directions
as well as whether or not the change in probability was
positive, negative, or remained the same. Within a real mission,
the change in position influences the ISAR image seen by
the operator which determines the decision made regarding
whether or not the track is likely to be performing an illegal
operation.
Due to the real-time simulation requirement, and for sim-
plicity, an ISAR image generation method in conjunction with
an image classifier was avoided. Instead, the ISAR image
for maritime surveillance was represented by a probability
matrix in terms of sea state, relative azimuth and elevation
between the track and the platform, SNR, number of revisits,
and vessel type. In essence, this probability could be thought of
as the output from an ISAR image classifier. A low probability
indicates that the observed track is unlikely to be performing
any illegal operations whilst a high probability indicates that
the track is likely performing an illegal operation. Furthermore,
a probability such as 0.5 indicates uncertainty in whether the
track is performing illegal operations or not.
Task 3 is represented by the BN shown in Fig. 7. The
first decision node M represents the move made in terms
of left, forward, and right. This decision is based on the
information nodes PI1, PD1, PI2, and PD2. PD1 represent the
move made at the previous step, and PI1 represents the change
in probability at the previous step. Similarly, PD2 and PI2
represent the move made and change in probability two steps
ago. For the BN, the upper and lower limits for determining if
the probability had changed positively or negatively were 0.05
and −0.05 respectively. The final decision node A represents
the action performed based on the updated probability I. The
action consists of three options: continue moving towards the
track, return to the surveillance path and note that the track
is not likely to be performing an illegal operation, or declare
the track as potentially carrying out an illegal operation. For
node I, the probability was discretized into probability bands
of 0.05 with a two larger bands of 0.2 in the middle as it was
assumed that the operator was likely to continue move towards
the track when the uncertainty was high.
When comparing the decisions made by the BN relative
to the operator, the recorded operator decision data was split
into training data and test data. The training data is the data
instances used to train the network, with the size of the training
data equal to N . The size of the test data was fixed at 100 data
instances for all tasks. The size of training data (i.e. N ) varied
depending on the tasks as certain tasks are able to learn faster.
For each value of N , 20 networks were obtained (with the
order of the training data randomized for every network). Each
of these networks was tested within the simulation against the
operator’s decisions using the test data. In other words, given
the same observed information, the decisions of the BN were
compared with the decisions previously made by the operator.
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Fig. 3: Task 1 represented as a Bayesian network.
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Fig. 5: Task 2 represented as a Bayesian network.
The accuracy for each decision was simply the number of
correct decisions relative to the operator divided by N . The
results of task 1, task 2, and task 3 in terms of accuracy
and error margins are shown in Fig. 4, 6, 8 respectively.
These graphs shown the mean accuracy of each decision node
for a given number of data instances with error bars shown
representing 1 standard error. Note that the accuracy axis starts
at 0.6.
For task 1, the decision node with the lowest accuracy is the
selection of tracks based on anomalous AIS information. This
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Fig. 8: Accuracy and error of each decision node for task 3.
is due to the fact that this node is only used when the AIS data
is known. Additionally, if the scene has few tracks available,
the track is occasionally selected before the fourth decision
is required. As such, with few data instances, the fourth AI
decision performs poorly, but with high data instances is able
to perform accurately. It is also unsurprising that decisions
further down the network required more data to achieve the
same performance. Data would only be seen for nodes further
down the network if previous decisions were made that led to
those nodes. As such, any missions with a long sequence of
decisions will require significantly more operator data than a
mission with a comparable number of decisions but performed
in parallel. However, the BN still provided high levels of
accuracy for this mission.
For task 2, it is surprising that the node furthest down the
network performs the best. However, this is due to the fact
that this decision is more deterministic than the other two
decisions in the network. In other words, the operator will
likely only move towards the track when there in specific
and defined situations. The stochastic nature of the SS and
CMV decisions results in the accuracy plateauing at around
0.9. Whilst this may seem to offer lower performance than the
previous task, the BN is capable of learning the probabilities
for these decisions, but it is desirable for any form of AI to be
deterministic rather than stochastic (i.e. the AI will perform
the same action given the same inputs). As such, the accuracy
is reduced in by operating in a deterministic manner.
For task 3, initially the action node has a higher accuracy,
but at a greater number of data instances the move node is
higher. This is due to the more uncertain nature of the move
decision which, as mentioned previously, results in a reduced
accuracy due to the deterministic manner of the AI.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, the use of a Bayesian network for imitating
a radar operator carrying out a maritime surveillance mission
has been outlined. The network’s probabilities were learned
from operator decision data with the used of a real-time
radar simulation for three common surveillance tasks. The
network was then tested within the simulation against the
operator’s decisions given the same observational information.
The results show the high accuracy and low error margin of
the BN relative to the operator indicating its usefulness in
imitating a human operator and also its usefulness in being
able to carry out the missions autonomously.
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